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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
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My remarks in this paper are intended to provide an overview of the pro­
cess that led to the emergence of the EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) 
project and its adoption with the Maastricht Treaty. The momentum of the 
EMU process was greatest in the period between June 1988, when the 
Hannover European Council was held, and October 1993, when the Federal 
Republic of Germany formally ratified the Maastricht Treaty. In this five-year 
period, EMU can be seen as having been at the centre of European develop­
ments and Germany as having been at the centre of the centre - not only in the 
sense that the two dates are related to Germany but also because EMU is 
largely about moving from the DM to a common currency in Europe and be­
cause the German model of a central bank has been adopted for the European 
Central Bank. Moreover, the decisive political interaction in the crucial phase 
of those five years was between the political developments that led to German 
unification and the issue of EMU.
The five years in question can be divided into three sub-periods: the first, of 
preparation, lasted from 1988 to 1990; the second, of negotiation of the new 
Treaty, coincided almost exactly with the year 1991; and the third, of ratifica­
tion of the Treaty, continued for most of 1992 and 1993. In the first two peri­
ods, a series of exceptionally favourable circumstances combined to make the 
result achieved at Maastricht possible; however, during the third period there 
was a change which led to serious difficulties that almost prevented the Treaty 
from being ratified.
I have my own views on all three processes, with each of which I was asso­
ciated at various points. Accordingly, my presentation will be a rather subjec­
tive one and will involve an attempt to answer four questions: First, what is an 
economic and monetary union? Second, how did EMU become part of the 
European system? Third, what institutional innovations did EMU bring to the 
EU Constitution? And, fourth, what are the prospects for implementing EMU?
1 Mr Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa is Deputy Director General of the Bank of Italy. This is 
the text of the Robert Schuman Lecture given at the Sixth Session of the Academy of 




























































































II. What Is an EMU?
The expression ‘EMU’ dates back to the late 1960s, when it became part of 
the language of the meetings of EC Heads of State and Government and was 
the subject of the Werner Report published in October 1970. The objective of 
progressively realizing economic and monetary union was confirmed when the 
Single European Act was adopted in 1986 and was launched again at the 
meeting of the European Council held in Hannover in June 1988. Exactly what 
was meant by economic and monetary union was not defined even at the 
Hannover meeting, which devoted only a few lines to the subject and really did 
no more than set up a committee under the chairmanship of the President of 
the Commission, Jacques Delors, with the task of ‘studying and proposing con­
crete stages leading towards this union’. One of the first steps taken by the 
Delors Committee was to define the concept and it did so by concluding that it 
essentially meant three things: first, the single market; second, some fiscal or 
budgetary discipline; and third, monetary union strictu sensu, namely the uni­
fication of monetary matters.
The first component, the single market, had already been defined and there 
was no change in the provisions of the Treaty of Rome as amended by the 
Single European Act; the economic content of the single market is clear, as is 
its institutional content.
The inclusion of the second component, fiscal or budgetary discipline, was, 
and remains, debatable and debated. It was decided very early in the Delors 
Committee that some form of fiscal discipline was required as a safeguard to 
ensure that monetary union would be stable, that the value of money would not 
be threatened by fiscal disorder in the budgets of Member States. But the de­
cision to include this element in EMU was based on a mixture of economic and 
political arguments, which, in my view, were never thoroughly worked out in 
analytical terms. On economic grounds, there is no compelling argument for 
claiming that a monetary union cannot function without a fiscal union or, 
more generally, without a form of federal discipline in budgetary matters. 
Federal discipline in participants’ budgets is not a feature of most federations. 
Yet, in all federations the federal authorities have budgetary and monetary 
powers. There is thus a difference between talking about fiscal discipline and 
fiscal responsibility. Certainly, on political grounds it was indispensable to 
present monetary union as being based on sound budgetary policies, since con­




























































































public opinion that it would be built on solid fiscal foundations. Although I do 
not myself believe that fiscal discipline is a necessary condition for monetary 
union, I am firmly convinced that budgetary discipline is desirable, and there­
fore welcome the fact that Maastricht reinforced the fiscal discipline that 
would otherwise not have been backed by Treaty provisions.
When we talk about discipline in the fiscal and budgetary field, we are 
speaking essentially about national budgets, not about the Community budget, 
which has its own procedure and is not large enough to destabilize the Euro­
pean economy. Responsibility for Member States’ budget policies lies with na­
tional parliaments, or is shared between parliament and the executive. What 
the Community has done by embodying elements of fiscal and budgetary dis­
cipline in the Treaty is not to take that power away from national authorities - 
that would have been impossible. Rather it has established certain fundamental 
rules - fiscal deficits should not exceed 3 per cent of gross domestic product 
(GDP), the public debt should not exceed 60 per cent of GDP - and introduced 
a procedure for monitoring countries which exceed these limits and for exert­
ing pressure on them to comply. Whether this procedure will be effective is 
very difficult to predict. It is half-way between expressing a wish and estab­
lishing a binding rule. As is common in this field, only time will tell whether 
it will work or not. Clearly, the ultimate decision on national budgets is left in 
national hands; what has been created at the European Union level is a power 
to monitor, to exert pressure, but not to mandate actions. These matters, of 
course, hardly lend themselves to being settled in court.
The third component of EMU, monetary union strictu sensu, is usually de­
fined as ‘the irrevocable locking of exchange rates’, the expression frequently 
used in the Delors Report, or the adoption of a single currency. Fundamen­
tally, however, monetary union is neither of these two things. Defining mone­
tary union as a fixed exchange rate regime means defining it from the angle of 
international monetary relationships, rather than from that of the monetary 
regimes to be found in individual countries. It suggests that currencies are 
linked in some way, but that there is still a plurality of currencies and a plu­
rality of institutions responsible for them. The Bretton Woods system was a 
fixed exchange rate regime, as is the European Monetary System (EMS) to a 
certain extent. No one would call the DM system in Germany or the dollar 
system in the United States a system of fixed exchange rates, although, of 
course, having one currency means having one immutable measure for the 




























































































It is possible to conceive of a monetary union without a single currency and 
even to imagine a monetary union, albeit a very special one, without fixed ex­
change rates. The essence of a monetary union is institutional, not economic. It 
is the fact that the responsibility for monetary decisions is shifted to one single 
institution instead of being entrusted to a plurality of central banks, whether or 
not they are tied by an exchange rate arrangement. In other words, creating a 
monetary union means moving from a plurality of decision-making centres to 
just one. It is conceivable that this centre could still run a system with a plu­
rality of currencies having different names and, with a further effort of 
imagination, that it could even be empowered to change the exchange rates 
among them, although there is no historical precedent for such an arrange­
ment. On the other hand, there are examples of a plurality of currencies 
within a monetary union. Before the decimal system was adopted in Britain, 
guineas were used to pay lawyers, doctors and tailors, while pounds were used 
to pay restaurant bills and the rent. Naturally, the exchange rate was fixed, the 
conversion between the two currencies was automatic and the central bank was 
the same for both.
As regards the division of competences, in the monetary field there will be 
no sharing of policy-making competences, though decentralization will be 
possible in the implementation of policy decisions. For instance, banknotes can 
be printed in factories located in the various Member States, but how many 
should be printed cannot be decided independently in each country. Monetary 
policy-making is an all-or-nothing situation and it has been agreed that the 
competences will be placed entirely in Community hands.
My answer to the first question is thus that a monetary union is a system in 
which monetary decisions are taken by a single institution.
in. How Did EMU Enter into the Maastricht Treaty?
My answer to this question will be a summary one1. The first point to be 
made is that something like a monetary union was implicit from the very start 
of the European Communities. The Treaties were written in the 1950s when
1 For a more detailed account of the events leading up to the Maastricht Treaty, see T. 





























































































the Bretton Woods system was still in force, providing a kind of monetary 
union to the world. The ‘fixed but adjustable’ parity system was taken so much 
for granted as part of the international order that the Treaty of Rome neither 
mentioned it nor embodied any of its rules. However, if the Treaty is read 
carefully, there clearly emerges a conceptual, or analytical, economic frame­
work, and exchange rate fixity or discipline is an integral part of this frame­
work. It is thus not surprising that the subject of EMU found a place on the 
agenda of the European Community in the second half of the 1960s, since this 
is when the Bretton Woods system began to unravel and the problem of 
replacing it with something else came to be given serious consideration.
The second point is that the years from 1988 to 1993, and particularly the 
period from 1988 to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992, 
were marked by a series of circumstances that played a key role in leading to 
this Treaty. These include: the widespread recognition of two economic 
propositions underlying the idea of a monetary union; broader factors related 
to the economic and political situation in Europe; some special political condi­
tions; certain ideas that gathered strength during the period; and a number of 
tactical choices that were made. Let me briefly look at each of these sets of 
reasons.
The first of the economic propositions is what I call the ‘inconsistent quar­
tet’: it states that fixed exchange rates, free trade, complete capital mobility 
and national independence in the conduct of monetary policy are mutually in­
consistent. Indeed, the development of international economic and monetary 
relationships over recent decades can be seen as a constant effort to deal with 
this inconsistency, both within Europe and on a global scale. In today’s world 
of complete capital mobility, attempts are made to preserve freedom of trade 
by resorting to exchange rate arrangements, but these cannot function for long 
while national monetary policies are fully independent. In Europe, the incon­
sistency became increasingly evident following the decisive moves toward the 
completion of the single market and the tendency in the late 1980s for the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) to turn into a fixed exchange rate regime. 
The relaunching of EMU represented the radical solution to the inconsistency, 
the squaring of the circle, the reconciliation of the four elements of the quartet 
by replacing the plurality of decision-making centres with a single institution 
and thereby suppressing the independence of national monetary policies.
The second of the two economic propositions I referred to concerns the 




























































































efficiency, pursued at the international level mainly through free trade; an 
equitable distribution of income, pursued in most countries through fiscal 
policy and, internationally, through development aid and the activities of the 
World Bank, etc.; and macroeconomic stability, in terms of budgetary and 
monetary stability. There is an economic and political relationship among 
these three objectives. By pushing ahead with the completion of the single 
market and the goal of efficiency, the European Community left the other two 
sides of this triangle, that is equity and stability, somewhat behind. Many of 
the developments of the late 1980s, after the single market process had been 
launched, can be seen as attempts to rebalance the three sides of this triangle, 
with monetary union as the ultimate solution.
In this presentation I have collapsed the monetary and economic arguments 
into the two propositions that I call the inconsistent quartet and the efficiency- 
equity-stability triangle. I am well aware of a further argument that is often 
made in support of EMU. It runs as follows: monetary union is desirable 
mainly because the present arrangement results in the whole of Europe being 
affected by decisions made by the Bundesbank in Frankfurt, primarily with a 
view to the state of the German economy but with consequences for all the 
other economies that have tied their currencies to the DM. In short, non-Ger­
man monetary policy-makers do not like the present situation and would pre­
fer an arrangement whereby the perspective of monetary policy-making would 
not be purely German, even if it imposed exactly the same monetary disci­
pline. I would like, however, to put this monetary argument for EMU some­
what differently; monetary union is desirable not so much because we do not 
want monetary policy to be decided by the Bundesbank for everybody else, but 
rather because the need for it is so great that for lack of a Community solution 
we have the ersatz of the Bundesbank filling the gap. This state of affairs is not 
good for the other Member States and it is bad for Germany too. It is not pos­
sible for a currency to play the role of a national as well as an international 
currency indefinitely without running up against almost insurmountable 
dilemmas, which, in the end, will prevent it from performing either of the two 
functions properly. This difficulty was experienced by the dollar before the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods System and one can conclude that the crisis of 
the ERM after 1992 was also due to the increasing difficulty the DM had in 
playing the double role. In fact, there is a striking analogy between the decline 
of the dollar system and the decline of the DM system. The DM system started 
out in 1974 with a small ‘Snake’, grew with the ERM and expanded further 
with the inclusion of the peseta, the escudo and the pound; today there is only 




























































































cases there was an inflationary shock - the United States had to cope with the 
effects of the Vietnam War, and the Bundesbank with those of German unifi­
cation - and the need to give priority to domestic objectives; the Federal 
Reserve responded with an inflationary monetary policy, the Bundesbank with 
a disinflationary one. In both cases there was a conflict between the currency’s 
domestic and international roles. So the national, or hegemonic, solution to the 
need for monetary union has proved not to be economically viable and it 
would certainly not be politically viable in a Community such as the one we 
have created, either in terms of Germany’s interest or in that of its partners.
What then are the economic and monetary reasons for wanting monetary 
union? In a nutshell, I would say that without monetary union there can be no 
lasting discipline in exchange rate relationships: the devaluation of the Italian 
lira is seen by many as an example, but there would inevitably be others. 
Without such discipline, protectionism would emerge again sooner or later. 
Some countries are already toying with the idea, though I do not think much 
will happen for the time being. In my opinion, the complaints of French man­
ufacturers about the competitive advantage the devaluation has given to Italian 
industry are, on the whole, unjustified, but they may be heard politically. Parts 
of the single market could sooner or later be disrupted. Indeed, I am firmly 
convinced that without a single currency, a single market cannot function 
properly for long. This is both a monetary and an economic reason for want­
ing EMU, though I admit I am here simply stating my conviction without pre­
senting the full case.
Turning to the broader economic and political factors I mentioned earlier, 
there is clear evidence that the European construction has advanced most ef­
fectively in periods in which economic expansion combined with political 
stability. These twin conditions were satisfied from the mid-1980s up to the 
opening of the 1990s, an unusually long period. The economic expansion that 
started in Europe in 1984 lasted until the beginning of the following decade, 
and occurred against a background of very stable political leadership. In al­
most every European country, this period coincided with the longest-serving 
prime minister (or head of state) of the century: Mitterand in France, Kohl in 
Germany, Lubbers in the Netherlands, Martens in Belgium, and Gonzales in 
Spain. Such permanence was crucial because an effective implementation of 
international cooperation projects requires political stability and firmly estab­




























































































Of the other factors I mentioned, I shall only recall the powerful role 
played by two ideas that became popular in the 1980s, one in the economic 
field and the other in the monetary field. In the economic field, it came to be 
held that public intervention in the economy should be reduced and more 
scope allowed to the play of market forces, which can be summed up in the 
expression ‘minimum government’. In the monetary field, the paradigm grad­
ually prevailed that monetary policy should be primarily concerned with price 
stability and central banks made independent. The two components of this 
paradigm are clearly related, since an independent central bank is much more 
acceptable if it is not entrusted with politically sensitive choices such as that 
between more employment and more price stability, which was how monetary 
policy was usually presented in the 1950s and 1960s. The two ideas of mini­
mum government and an independent central bank oriented towards price 
stability were very important in facilitating the acceptance of monetary union 
since they tended to minimize the shift of sovereignty. If the central bank is 
not entrusted with politically sensitive decisions, it becomes a more technical 
institution, one that has to make sure a metre is always a metre long, neither 
more nor less, and the transfer of this function from the national to the Euro­
pean level is thus less politically charged; governments would be less inclined 
to feel that they were relinquishing something that was theirs by right. What is 
ironic is that a prominent opponent of EMU, Margaret Thatcher, and the 
monetary institution that has supposedly most to lose from monetary union, 
the Bundesbank, were in fact strong supporters of these two ideas, which ulti­
mately helped to create a climate favourable to the entry of EMU into the 
Treaty.
In sum, entrance of the EMU into the Treaty was propitiated by a series of 
favourable factors all operating in the same direction, almost by accident, 
though to be sure necessary things sometimes happen by chance.
IV. What Institutional Innovations Has EMU Brought?
Though I do not believe my list is exhaustive, I see four main areas of inno­
vation. The first is that the provisions of the Treaty concerning monetary 
union - and I shall restrict my remarks to monetary union because this is the 
truly innovative aspect of the Treaty - take European Union to the end of the 




























































































area have the principles underlying the EU’s construction been so completely 
implemented. One of the reasons why monetary matters have moved so far 
ahead is that in the monetary field there is much less divisibility than in other 
economic fields: monetary powers are either here or there, they cannot be 
shared. Consequently, once the idea of monetary union had been launched, the 
only options were to reject it or to go the whole hog. There is no federal sys­
tem, not even the loosest, in which monetary power is shared between differ­
ent levels of government. En passant, it is somewhat paradoxical that the no­
tion of subsidiarity, which in a way is the opposite of indivisibility, should 
have entered into the Treaty on the same occasion. As far as I know, the word 
subsidiarity was not to be found in the Treaty before Maastricht and I remem­
ber that when the paragraph on subsidiarity in the Delors Report was first 
drafted, the word was unknown to most of the members of the Committee. It 
has been claimed that subsidiarity does not apply to monetary policy because 
this is indivisible; however, if subsidiarity means carrying out government 
functions at the lowest possible level, the attribution of monetary powers to a 
Community body rather than to the Member States is indeed a case, albeit a 
limited one, of its application.
The second area of innovation concerns the debate on multiple speeds and 
variable geometry. The Maastricht Treaty contains two formulas that repre­
sent a major change: the ‘opting-out clause’ for the United Kingdom and 
Denmark, and the ‘convergence criteria’ to qualify for the final stage of mone­
tary union. Both these formulas allow the European Union to move to the final 
stage of monetary union without all the Member States having to participate 
from the start Opting-out refers to the political will of Member States to par­
ticipate or not in a project, in this case monetary union, while the convergence 
criteria establish a performance requirement for those wishing to do so. This 
is very important because most of the debate on multiple speeds and variable 
geometry is about how to combine the two elements of will and performance 
in determining Member States’ participation in projects designed to advance 
the unification process. These innovations also entail some constraints for the 
future. For instance, it has now been accepted that the Treaty is susceptible to 
change through the application of an opt-out clause; this sets an important 
precedent. It has also been accepted that Member States can be excluded from 
participation in projects on performance grounds. Nonetheless, while the right 
to opt out has been recognized, no provision has yet been made for what is 
called the right to opt forward  or up. Nor has it been decided whether the 
group of countries at the leading edge of the Union’s development should be 




























































































again important innovations came about more as a response to specific prob­
lems than as the result of a comprehensive analysis of the Union’s institutional 
architecture. They will undoubtedly solve some problems in the future, but 
they will also cause others.
The third area of innovation concerns the design of the key organs of mone­
tary union. The Treaty provides for the Board of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) to have fewer members than the number of countries participating in 
the monetary union. It is as though some Member States had no member in the 
Commission. The Treaty also provides for the decision-making body of the 
ECB, the Council, to be made up of the members of the Board and the Gover­
nors of the national central banks. It is as if there were a body at the Union 
level made up of both members of the Commission and Ministers, and it is this 
body that will decide monetary policy. Further, and of fundamental impor­
tance, the voting rule within the ECB Council is one head, one vote. The 
Union’s monetary policy will be determined by the head of the Institut Moné­
taire Luxembourgeois as much as by the head of the Bundesbank. The fact that 
this exceptionally wise decision was taken so smoothly in the process of de­
signing the Treaty verges on the miraculous. It was recognized that the only 
way to obtain collective decisions based on wisdom rather than negotiation, to 
make sure that the members of the Council would be really independent, was 
to have one head, one vote. If you have as many votes as your GDP, you are 
not independent, but represent your GDP, your country. The foregoing are 
thus fundamental changes in the conception of the organs of the Union that did 
not exist before the entry of EMU into the Treaty.
The fourth innovation, which unfortunately is a negative one in my view, is 
the fact that, for the first time, the institution entrusted with carrying out the 
transition, and hence with implementing the Treaty in the field of monetary 
union, is a transitory institution, the European Monetary Institute, different 
from the final one, the European Central Bank. There was considerable debate 
and, in a way, a tug-of-war about this. Those who did not want the European 
Central Bank to be created from the beginning won the day and this may 
prove to be a serious weakness in the implementation of the Treaty. It is as if 
the Commission had not been created in 1958 on the ground that it had no 
competences at the beginning because nothing was there yet. This is what we 
have now in the European Monetary Institute, an institution lacking the powers 
that the Commission and the Council historically had in order to implement 




























































































V. What Are the Prospects for Implementing EMU?
Obviously, a treaty becomes reality if it is signed, ratified and imple­
mented. The Maastricht Treaty has been signed; it has been ratified, though 
only just; for the moment it has not been implemented. The ratification pro­
cess was so difficult that the Treaty has been likened to the fish of Heming­
way’s Old Man and the Sea: no more than bones, the flesh having been eaten 
during the journey. In fact, ratification was achieved, but in the process the 
key element of the EMS, the Exchange Rate Mechanism, and most of the pro- 
European momentum and goodwill that had permitted the signing of the 
Treaty were lost. Yet, the ratification of the Treaty makes an enormous dif­
ference; if it had not been ratified, Europe would probably not have come 
back to the idea of monetary union for decades, just as the idea of a common 
defence policy has not been on the agenda since the rejection of that treaty in 
1954. Having been ratified, the Treaty will provide, for better or for worse, 
the basis for European developments in the coming years.
The implementation of the Treaty will depend crucially on economic, polit­
ical and technical developments. I will briefly mention some of the factors 
involved and hope in this way to throw some light on the road ahead. Conver­
gence is one of the key economic factors; without sufficient convergence, there 
will be no monetary union for the reasons I gave earlier; in other words, not 
perhaps because complete convergence is strictly necessary on economic 
grounds, but because it is indispensable on political grounds. The second eco­
nomic factor concerns the behaviour of financial markets. Greatly to my sur­
prise, European currencies did not fluctuate as much as might have been ex­
pected after the widening of the EMS fluctuation margins two years ago. We 
have seen that markets have the power to produce instability in exchange rates 
and hence, sooner or later, to cause inflation rates to diverge. Central banks 
have proved unwilling or unable to oppose these forces, so in a sense we are in 
the hands of the markets. The third economic factor is the business cycle; it 
will be more difficult to find the will to go ahead with monetary union unless 
the European economy is expanding.
On the political front, a period of renewal of the leadership in the key 
countries was completed with the French elections held in May 1995. The pro­
cess whereby the leaders of the Member States become personally acquainted, 
make plans and set priorities is only just beginning. In a broader context, the 




























































































conference, and we do not know what priority will be assigned to the imple­
mentation of monetary union or how political union will develop.
On the technical front, as the recent Green Paper of the Commission shows, 
there is a considerable amount of preparatory work involved in the implemen­
tation of monetary union, in much the same way as it took eight years to put 
the legislative and regulatory framework in place for the start of the single 
market on 1 January 1993. It will not take so long to prepare for monetary 
union, but one or two years will be necessary, not weeks or months. These are 
the factors involved and a banker’s prudence suggests that I should stop here 
and not try to envisage how they may come into play.
Having said that, let me expand on convergence criteria. I will tell you first 
why the decision to include convergence criteria in the Treaty was political 
and then why I do not think it has a very strong economic basis. It would have 
been very difficult to explain to German public opinion that the DM was to be 
abandoned to join forces with weaker currencies, unless there was some guar­
antee that the economy and the budget of the countries involved would be 
managed in a more stability-oriented way than they had been. Such a guarantee 
was a political necessity. In Germany annual inflation has never exceeded 7 
per cent in the last forty years; in Italy to take just the example of my country, 
the average for the last forty years has been above 7 per cent. Such differences 
in monetary stability performances explain why abandoning the DM is not 
popular in Germany.
As for the question of whether the convergence criteria are economically 
indispensable, monetary union can be seen as amounting for all practical pur­
poses to what economists call ‘monetary reform’, namely changing the cur­
rency, changing the central bank and establishing a new institutional system 
for managing money. Historically, monetary reform has been the outcome of 
periods of extreme disorder, not of things going well. Germany can again be 
taken as an example. Monetary reform there served to bring to an end a pe­
riod of hyperinflation, during which prices had risen by even more than 1,000 
per cent per day. Historical experience is not that you have to clean the house 
before reform. Just the opposite has been the case: institutional change has 
been a necessity when things were going badly, not a luxury people could 
afford when they were running well.
As regards the criteria for public finances, there is no example of an eco­




























































































Switzerland - where the budgetary powers of the members of the federation - 
the cantons, the Landers, the states, and so on - are restricted by the federal 
authorities or by the federal constitution. They may, of course, have self-im­
posed discipline; for instance, at the level of state constitutions in the United 
States. So convergence criteria in this field are something new. It would take 
longer to explain more analytically why there is no economic theorem that I 
know of that is able to demonstrate the need for something of the sort.
I am nonetheless very much in favour of convergence criteria. I am in 
favour because I believe they are good per se, as a strong inducement to sound 
policies. I would also be in favour, I must say, of a balanced budget constitu­
tional amendment in the United States - but for its own sake, not because the 
dollar cannot be managed without it.
VI. Conclusion: Is EMU Desirable, Inevitable?
By way of conclusion let me say that I never thought that what we have now 
in the Maastricht Treaty was the only possible outcome of the process started 
in 1988 in Hannover. On its own, the rather impressive list of factors that 
played favourably could not have produced this outcome. In January 1994, 
after describing the factors that I have summarized here in more detail, I 
wrote:
To attempt to comprehend how the Treaty of Maastricht came about is not 
to assume that Maastricht was the only possible outcome of all the above fac­
tors. Even those of us who laboured to complement the Single Market with a 
monetary union and to embody this transformation in a treaty held only that 
such a transformation was desirable and feasible, not that it was probable or 
much less inevitable. There were many, indeed very many, occasions during 
the ten years of its preparation when events could have taken a quite different 
course: the decisions of individuals, the political environment in which they 
operated, the economic situation, and the background historical events could 
have combined to give a different turn to the whole process. Thus we may 
speak of a benevolent historical conspiracy but certainly not of inevitability.
And then I quoted Guicciardini, the Italian political thinker and historian of 




























































































things of this world are subject to a thousand random chances and accidents, 
unexpected help may appear in many forms in the course of time for those 
who have obstinately persevered’. In short, the outcome was certainly possible, 
though perhaps rather unlikely; it nonetheless came about. Trying to explain 
ex post why something happened should never imply that one considers the 
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